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Abstract
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) is to retrieve one message out of K messages
replicated at N databases, without revealing the identity of the desired message to the databases. We
consider the problem of PIR with colluding servers and eavesdroppers, named T-EPIR. Specifically, any
T out of N databases may collude, that is, they may communicate their interactions with the user to
guess the identity of the requested message. An eavesdropper is curious to know the database and can tap
in on the incoming and outgoing transmissions of any E databases. The databases share some common
randomness unknown to the eavesdropper and the user, and use the common randomness to generate the
answers, such that the eavesdropper can learn no information about the K messages. Define R∗ as the
optimal ratio of the number of the desired message information bits to the number of total downloaded
bits, and ρ∗ to be the optimal ratio of the information bits of the shared common randomness to the
information bits of the desired file. In our previous work [1], we found that when E ≥ T , the optimal
ratio that can be achieved (hence is the capacity) equals 1− E
N
. In this work, we focus on the case when
E ≤ T . We derive an outer bound (converse bound) that R∗ ≤
(
1− T
N
) 1− E
N
·( TN )
K−1
1−( TN )
K . We also obtain
a lower bound (converse bound) of ρ∗ ≥
E
N
(
1−( TN )
K
)
(1− TN )
(
1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
) . For the achievability, we propose a
scheme which achieves the rate (inner bound) R =
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
− E
KN
. The amount of shared common
randomness used in the achievable scheme is
E
N (1−(
T
N
)K)
1− T
N
−
E
KN (1−(
T
N
)K)
times the file size. The gap between
the derived inner and outer bounds vanishes as the number of messages K tends to infinity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the situation where a user wants to retrieve a file (message) from a remotely stored database,
the nature of the data might be privacy-sensitive, for example medical records, stock prices etc.,
such that the user does not want to reveal the identity of the data retrieved. This is known as
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2the problem of private information retrieval (PIR). In some cases, the privacy of the database
needs also to be preserved. For example, if a user wants to retrieve his/her medical data from
a database, it is hoped that the user obtains no information about other users’ medical records.
This is known as the problem of symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR).
The problem of PIR and SPIR was firstly studied in the computer science literature. In [2],
[3], it is shown that if the messages are stored at a single database, the only possible scheme
for the user is to download all the messages to guarantee information-theoretic privacy, which
is inefficient in practice. It is further shown that the communication cost can be reduced in
sublinear scale by replicating the database at multiple non-colluding servers [3]. To further
protect the privacy of the database such that the user obtains no more information regarding the
other messages besides the requested message, the problem of SPIR is introduced [4]. In [2]–
[4], the collection of messages stored at each database is modeled as a bit string, and the user
wishes to retrieve a single bit. In these works, the communication cost is measured as the sum
of the transmission at the querying phase from user to servers and at the downloading phase
from servers to user.
When the message size is significantly large and the target is to minimize the communication
cost of only the downloading phase, the metric of the downloading cost is defined as the number
of bits downloaded per bit of the retrieved message, and the reciprocal of which is named the
PIR capacity. A series of recent works derive information-theoretic limits of various versions
of the PIR problem [5]–[11] etc. The leading work in the area is by Sun and Jafar [5], where
the authors find the capacity of the PIR problem with replicated databases. In subsequent works
by Sun and Jafar [6], [7], the PIR capacity with duplicated databases and colluding servers, and
the SPIR capacity with duplicated (non-colluding) databases are derived. In [8]–[10], Banawan
and Ulukus find the capacity of the PIR problem with coded databases, multi-message PIR
with replicated databases, and the PIR problem with colluding and Byzantine databases. In
our previous works [1], [11], [12], we derive the capacity of the SPIR problem with coded
databases, linear SPIR with colluding and coded databases, and the SPIR problem with Byzantine
adversaries and eavesdroppers.
Another series of works focus more on the coding structure of the storage system, and study
schemes and information limits for various PIR problems with coded databases [13]–[17]. In [13],
PIR is achieved by downloading one extra bit other than the desired file, given that the number
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3of storage nodes grows with file size, which can be impractical in some storage systems. In [14],
storage overhead can be reduced by increasing the number of storage nodes. In [15], tradeoff
between storage cost and downloading cost is analyzed. Subsequently in [16], explicit schemes
which match the tradeoff in [15] are presented. It is worth noting that in [8], the capacity of
PIR for coded database is settled, which improves the results in [15], [16]. Recently in [17], the
authors present a framework for PIR from coded databases with colluding servers.
In our previous work [1], we studied the problem of SPIR from replicated databases with
colluding databases and eavesdroppers, named T-ESPIR. Briefly speaking, a user wants to retrieve
one file out of K files that are replicatively stored at N databases. Any T out of the N servers
may collude, that is, they may share their communication with the user to infer the identity
of the requested file. A passive eavesdropper is curious to know the database and can tap in
on the incoming and outgoing transmissions of any E servers. In the problem of T-ESPIR, it
is required that the user learns no information about the database other than the requested file.
In [1], we show that the information-theoretical capacity of the T-ESPIR problem is 1− max(T,E)
N
,
if the databases share common randomness with amount at least
max(T,E)
N−max(T,E)
times the file size.
In Section VI.B in [1], we discussed that if database-privacy is not required, i.e. the user can
learn information about the other files, and when E ≥ T , the capacity of the T-EPIR problem
is 1− E
N
.
In this work, we continue the study of the T-EPIR problem when E ≤ T . We derive an outer
bound (converse bound) that R∗ ≤
(
1− T
N
) 1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
1−( TN )
K . We also obtain a lower bound (converse
bound) of ρ∗ ≥
E
N
(
1−( TN )
K
)
(1− TN )
(
1− E
N
·( TN )
K−1
) . For the achievability, we propose a scheme which achieves
the rate (inner bound) R =
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
− E
KN
. The amount of shared common randomness used in
the achievable scheme is
E
N (1−(
T
N
)K)
1− T
N
− E
KN (1−(
T
N
)K)
times the file size. The capacity of T-ESPIR when
E < T remains an open problem. In Section III, we discuss four special cases in which the
capacity is known or can be easily derived, and reveal that our outer bound is tight for the four
special cases. On the other hand, the inner bound is tight for three cases but one, namely, when
E = T , the derived inner bound does not match with the capacity at this point. For illustration,
we plot the results in Figure 1 and Figure 2 for some chosen parameters. It can be observed
from the figures that the gap between inner and outer bounds decays and vanishes as K tends
to infinity.
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4II. MODEL
A. Notation
Let [m : n] denote the set {m,m+1, . . . , n} for m ≤ n. To simplify the notation, denote the
set of random variables {Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xn} by X[m:n]. For an index set I = {i1, i2, . . . , in},
denote the set of variables with the index set {Xi : i ∈ I} byXI . For a matrix S, let S[:, I] denote
the submatrix of S comprised of the columns corresponding to the index set I. The transpose of
matrix G is denoted by GT. Let ∼ denote the statistical equivalence between random variables,
that is, if X ∼ Y , then X and Y are identically distributed.
B. Problem Description
Replicated databases: A collection of K independent messages (files), denoted byW1, . . . ,WK ,
are replicatively stored at N databases (nodes). Each message consists L information bits.
Therefore, for any k ∈ [1 : K],
H(Wk) = L ; H(W1, . . . ,WK) = KL.
User queries: A user wants to retrieve a message Wκ with index κ from the database, where the
desired message index κ follows some prior distribution among [1 : K]. Let U denote a random
variable privately generated by the user, which represents the randomness of the query scheme
followed by the user. The random variable U is generated independently of the messages and
the desired file index. Let the realization of the file index κ be k, based on the realization of the
desired file index k and the realization of U , the user generates and sends queries to all nodes,
where the query received by node-n is denoted by Q
[k]
n . Let Q = [Q
[k]
n ]n∈[1:N ],k∈[1:K] denote the
complete query scheme, namely, the collection of all queries under all cases of desired message
index. We have that H(Q|U) = 0.
Common randomness: Let random variable S denote the common randomness shared by all
databases, the realization of which is known to all the databases but unavailable to the user and
the eavesdropper. The common randomness is utilized to protect the system-privacy (2) below,
that is, to prevent the eavesdropper from learning the messages.
Database answers: The databases generate answers according to the agreed scheme with the
user based on the received query Q
[k]
n , the stored messages W[1:K], and the common randomness
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5S. The answer generated and sent to the user by node n is denoted by A
[k]
n .
Eavesdropper: A passive eavesdropper can tap in on the incoming and outgoing transmissions
of E nodes in the system. The eavesdropper is “nice but curious,” in the sense that the goal of
the eavesdropper is to obtain some information about the database, without corrupting any trans-
mission. The user has no knowledge of the identity of the nodes tapped on by the eavesdropper.
T-EPIR: Based on the received answers A
[k]
[1:N ] and the query scheme Q, the user shall be able to
decode the requested message Wk with zero error. Any set of T databases may collude to guess
the requested message index, by communicating their interactions with the user. Two privacy
constraints must be satisfied:
• User-privacy: any T colluding databases shall not be able to obtain any information regard-
ing the identity of the requested message, i.e.,
I(κ;Q
[κ]
T , A
[κ]
T ,W[1:K], S) = 0, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (1)
• System-privacy: For any set of databases E with size at most E, and for any k ∈ [1 : K]:
I(W[1:K];Q
[k]
E , A
[k]
E ) = 0. (2)
Definition 1. The rate of a T-EPIR scheme is the number of information bits of the requested
file retrieved per downloaded answer bit. By symmetry among all files, for any k ∈ [1 : K],
RT-EPIR ,
H(Wk)∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
.
The optimal rate of T-EPIR schemes is denoted by R∗T-EPIR. The capacity CT-EPIR is the supremum
of RT-EPIR over all T-EPIR schemes.
Definition 2. The secrecy rate is the amount of common randomness shared by the storage nodes
relative to the file size, that is
ρT-EPIR ,
H(S)
H(Wk)
.
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we summarize the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1 (Capacity when E ≥ T ). For T-EPIR with K files replicated at N databases, where
DRAFT
6any T nodes may collude and an eavesdropper can tap in on the communication of any E nodes,
when E ≥ T , the capacity is
CT-EPIR =


1− E
N
, if ρT-EPIR ≥
E
N−E
0, otherwise
.
Remark: For the detailed proof of Theorem 1, we refer to Section V and Section VI.B of
our previous work [1].
Theorem 2 (Outer Bound when E ≤ T ). For T-EPIR with K files replicated at N databases,
where any T nodes may collude and an eavesdropper can tap in on the communication of any
E nodes, when E ≤ T ,
R∗T-EPIR ≤ RT-EPIR =
(
1−
T
N
)
1− E
N
·
(
T
N
)K−1
1−
(
T
N
)K . (3)
The secrecy rate, i.e. the ratio of the amount of common randomness to the file size is at least
ρT-EPIR ≥
E
N
(
1−( TN )
K
)
(1− TN )
(
1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
) .
Remark: The proof of the outer bound is in Section IV. The outer bound is tight, that is, it
can be achieved and is hence the capacity of the problem for the four special cases below.
• Case 1 (E = T ): From Theorem 1, the capacity is CT-EPIR = 1−
E
N
when E = T . The outer
bound in Theorem 2 is RT-EPIR =
(
1− T
N
) 1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
1−( TN )
K = 1 −
T
N
= 1 − E
N
= CT-EPIR when
E = T .
• Case 2 (E = 0): When there is no eavesdropper, i.e. E = 0, the problem reduce to the TPIR
problem in [6], where the authors derive the capacity to be CTPIR =
1− T
N
1−( TN )
K . The outer
bound in Theorem 2 is RT-EPIR =
(
1− T
N
) 1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
1−( TN )
K =
1− T
N
1−( TN )
K = CTPIR when E = 0.
• Case 3 (K →∞): In our previous work [1], we derive the T-ESPIR capacity to be CT-ESPIR =
1 − max (T,E)
N
= 1 − T
N
when E ≤ T . As with all previous works for various scenarios of
the PIR and SPIR problems, the PIR capacity reduces to the SPIR capacity when the
number of files K → ∞. The intuition is that, when the number of files increases, the
penalty in the downloading rate to protect database-privacy for SPIR decays. When there
are asymptotically infinitely many files, the information rate the user can learn about the
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to infinity, the outer bound tends to limK→∞RT-EPIR = limK→∞
(
1− T
N
) 1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
1−( TN )
K =
1− T
N
= CT-ESPIR.
• Case 4 (T = N): When all databases collude, that is T = N , if furthermore E = T = N ,
the capacity is 0 because the eavesdropper receives the same information as the user. If the
user can decode Wk, so does the eavesdropper. Hence, the problem is non-trivial only if
E is strictly smaller than T . Suppose each file consists L = N − E symbols from a large
enough finite field Fq, denoted by row vectors W
[1:L]
k for k ∈ [1 : K], consider the scheme
below.
The databases generate KE uniformly i.i.d. symbols from Fq, denoted by K length-E row
vectors S
[1:E]
k for k ∈ [1 : K]. Let G
E×N be the generating matrix of an (N,E)-MDS
code. The databases operate the (N,E)-MDS code on the common randomness vectors
to obtain K length-N vectors S¯
[1:N ]
k = S
[1:E]
k G
E×N for k ∈ [1 : K], such that any E
symbols from S¯
[1:N ]
k are uniformly identically distributed over Fq. For each k, let A
[1:N ]
k =
[0[1×E]W
[1:L]
k ] + S¯
[1:N ]
k where 0
[1×E] is a length-E zero vector, the user downloads Ank from
database n for each file index k. It can be checked that the user can decode Wk (in fact the
user can decode all files), and both user-privacy and system-privacy are guaranteed. The
rate achieved by the scheme is N−E
NK
.
The outer bound in Theorem 2 is RT-EPIR =
(
1− T
N
) 1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
1−( TN )
K =
1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
1+ T
N
+···+( TN )
K−1 =
1−E
N
K
= N−E
NK
when T = N , which is achieved by the scheme above.
Theorem 3 (Inner Bound when E ≤ T ). For T-EPIR with K files replicated at N databases,
where any T nodes may collude and an eavesdropper can tap in on the communication of any
E nodes, when E ≤ T ,
R∗T-EPIR ≥ RT-EPIR =
1− T
N
1− ( T
N
)K
−
E
KN
(4)
Remark: The inner bound is achieved by the scheme described in Section V. We discuss
below the rate achieved by our scheme for the four special cases discussed above in which the
outer bound in Theorem 2 is tight.
• Case 1 (E = T ): The capacity of T-EPIR is CT-EPIR = 1−
E
N
= 1− T
N
when E = T , that is,
DRAFT
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Fig. 1: Plot of the bounds as functions of T
N
.
the rate of 1− T
N
can be achieved by the scheme in our previous work [1]. When E = T ,
the rate achieved by the scheme in Section V is RT-EPIR =
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
− E
KN
=
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
− T
KN
=
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
·
(
1 − 1
K
(
T
N
+ ( T
N
)2 + · · · + ( T
N
)K
))
, which is strictly smaller than 1 − T
N
when
T 6= N . Therefore, our scheme in Section V is not optimal when E = T . In other words,
the inner bound in Theorem 3 is not tight for the case E = T .
• Case 2 (E = 0): When there is no eavesdropper hence E = 0, the rate achieved is RT-EPIR =
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
− E
KN
=
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
, which matches with the TPIR capacity derived in [6], hence is
optimal.
• Case 3 (K → ∞): When the number of files K tends to infinity, limK→∞RT-EPIR =
limK→∞
(
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
− E
KN
)
= 1− T
N
. Hence, the inner bound tends to the T-ESPIR capacity
as K →∞.
• Case 4 (T = N): When all databases collude hence T = N , the rate achieved by the scheme
in this work is RT-EPIR =
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
− E
KN
= 1
K
− E
KN
= N−E
KN
, which matches the outer bound
when T = N , hence is optimal.
In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the results of Theorems 1- 3 are plotted for several sets of parameters.
It can be observed from the figures that when the number of messages K increases, the gap
between the inner and outer bounds decays and vanishes as K →∞.
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IV. OUTER BOUND WHEN E ≤ T
In this section, we derive the outer bound presented in Theorem 2 for the PIR problem with
T -colluding databases and E-eavesdropped databases when E ≤ T . We start from the case when
K = 1 and K = 2, then generalize to the case of arbitrary K in Section IV-C.
A. K = 1 Message
For any set of nodes E ⊂ [1 : N ] with |E| = E,
L = H(W1) = H(W1|Q)−H(W1|A
[1]
[1:N ],Q) (5)
= I(W1;A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) (6)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|W1,Q) (7)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[1]
E |W1,Q) (8)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[1]
E |Q), (9)
where (9) follows from system-privacy (2). Averaging over all E with size E from [1 : N ], we
have that
L ≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−
1(
N
E
) ∑
E⊂[1:N ]
|E|=E
H(A
[1]
E |Q). (10)
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By Han’s inequality [18],
1(
N
E
) ∑
E⊂[1:N ]
|E|=E
H(A
[1]
E |Q) ≥
E
N
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q). (11)
Therefore, L ≤
(
1− E
N
)
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)and hence R =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[1]
n )
≤ L
H(A
[1]
[1:N]
|Q)
≤ 1− E
N
.
B. K = 2 Messages
For any set of nodes T ⊂ [1 : N ] with |T | = T , because of user-privacy, we can ignore the
requested file index of AT ,
L = H(W1) = H(W1)−H(W1|A
[1]
[1:N ],Q) (12)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|W1,Q) (13)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(AT |W1,Q) (14)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−
T
N
H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|W1,Q), (15)
where the last step (15) is obtained by averaging over all T with size T and applying Han’s
inequality, similarly as (10) and (11) in Section IV-A. hence, we have that
H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|W1,Q) ≤
N
T
(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)− L
)
. (16)
For any set of nodes E ⊂ [1 : N ] with |E| = E, and any set of nodes T ⊂ [1 : N ] with
|T | = T ,
2L = H(W1,W2) (17)
= H(W1,W2|Q)−H(W1,W2|A
[1]
[1:N ], A
[2]
[1:N ],Q) (18)
= I(W1,W2;A
[1]
[1:N ], A
[2]
[1:N ]|Q) (19)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ], A
[2]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[1]
[1:N ], A
[2]
[1:N ]|W1,W2,Q) (20)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ], A
[2]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(AE |W1,W2,Q) (21)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ], A
[2]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(AE |Q) (22)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|A
[1]
[1:N ],Q)−H(AE |Q) (23)
DRAFT
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= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|A
[1]
[1:N ],W1,Q)−H(AE |Q) (24)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|AT ,W1,Q)−H(AE |Q) (25)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|W1,Q)−H(AT |W1,Q)−H(AE |Q) (26)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +
(
1−
T
N
)
H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|W1,Q)−H(AE |Q) (27)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +
(
1−
T
N
)
N
T
(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)− L
)
−H(AE |Q) (28)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +
(
1−
T
N
)
N
T
(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)− L
)
−
E
N
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) (29)
=
(
N
T
−
E
N
)
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−
(
N
T
− 1
)
L, (30)
where in (21) we can omit the message index because E is a set with size E ≤ T . (22) follows
from system-privacy (2). (24) is due to the fact that the user can decode W1 from A
[1]
[1:N ] and Q.
(27) is obtained by averaging over all T with size T and applying Han’s inequality. (28) follows
from (16). (29) is obtained by averaging over all E with size E and applying Han’s inequality.
Therefore, we have that
(
N
T
− E
N
)
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) ≥
(
N
T
+ 1
)
L and
R =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[1]
n )
≤
L
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)
≤
1− E
N
· T
N
1 + T
N
. (31)
C. K ≥ 3 Messages
For any set of nodes T ⊂ [1 : N ] with |T | = T , and its compliment set T = [1 : N ] \ T , and
for any k ∈ [2 : K],
H(A
[k]
T
|AT ,W[1:k−1],Q) (32)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|W[1:k−1],Q)−H(AT |W[1:k−1],Q) (33)
≤
(
1−
T
N
)
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|W[1:k−1],Q), (34)
where the last step follows by averaging over all T with size T and applying Han’s inequality.
From A
[1]
[1:N ], . . . , A
[k−1]
[1:N ] , the user can decode W[1:k−1], hence
(k − 1)L = I(W[1:k−1];A
[1]
[1:N ], . . . , A
[k−1]
[1:N ] |Q) (35)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ], . . . , A
[k−1]
[1:N ] |Q)−H(A
[1]
[1:N ], . . . , A
[k−1]
[1:N ] |W[1:k−1],Q) (36)
DRAFT
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≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ], . . . , A
[k−1]
[1:N ] |Q)−H(AT |W[1:k−1],Q) (37)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ], . . . , A
[k−1]
[1:N ] |Q)−
T
N
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|W[1:k−1],Q), (38)
where in (37), we can omit the message index of AT because from user-privacy, the answers of
any T databases are independent of the message index. Similar as above, the last step follows
by averaging over all T with size T and applying Han’s inequality. Because AT is independent
of the message index, we can set the index to k in the last step.
Therefore, from (34) and (38), for any k ∈ [2 : K],
H(A
[k]
T
|AT ,W[1:k−1],Q) (39)
≤
(
1−
T
N
)
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|W[1:k−1],Q) (40)
≤
(
1−
T
N
)
N
T
(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ], . . . , A
[k−1]
[1:N ] |Q)− (k − 1)L
)
(41)
=
(
N
T
− 1
)(
H(AT , A
[1]
T
, . . . , A
[k−1]
T
|Q)− (k − 1)L
)
(42)
=
(
N
T
− 1
)(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
, . . . , A
[k−1]
T
|AT , A
[1]
T
,W1,Q)− (k − 1)L
)
(43)
≤
(
N
T
− 1
)(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
, . . . , A
[k−1]
T
|AT ,W1,Q)− (k − 1)L
)
(44)
≤
(
N
T
− 1
)(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) + · · ·+H(A
[k−1]
T
|AT ,W[1:k−2],Q)− (k − 1)L
)
,
(45)
where (43) holds because from AT , A
[1]
T
and Q one can decode W1. The last step is obtained
by repeating the chain rule and by the fact that from AT , A
[i]
T
and Q one can decode Wi for
i = [2 : k − 2].
For any set of nodes E ⊂ [1 : N ] with |E| = E,
KL = H(W[1:K]) (46)
= I(W[1:K];AT , A
[1]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|Q) (47)
= H(AT , A
[1]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|Q)−H(AT , A
[1]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|W[1:K],Q) (48)
≤ H(AT , A
[1]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|Q)−H(AE |W[1:K],Q) (49)
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= H(AT , A
[1]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|Q)−H(AE |Q) (50)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|A
[1]
[1:N ],Q)−H(AE |Q) (51)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|A
[1]
[1:N ],W1,Q)−H(AE |Q) (52)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|AT ,W1,Q)−H(AE |Q) (53)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) +H(A
[3]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|A
[2]
T
, AT ,W1,Q)−H(AE |Q) (54)
= H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) +H(A
[3]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|A
[2]
T
, AT ,W1,W2,Q)−H(AE |Q)
(55)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) +H(A
[3]
T
, . . . , A
[K]
T
|AT ,W1,W2,Q)−H(AE |Q) (56)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) +H(A
[3]
T
, |AT ,W1,W2,Q) + . . . (57)
+H(A
[K]
T
, |AT ,W[1:K−1],Q)−H(AE |Q) (58)
≤ H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) +H(A
[3]
T
, |AT ,W1,W2,Q) + · · ·+
(
N
T
− 1
)(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)+
(59)
H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) + · · ·+H(A
[K−1]
T
|AT ,W[1:K−2],Q)− (K − 1)L
)
−H(AE |Q) (60)
=
N
T
(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) + · · ·+H(A
[K−1]
T
|AT ,W[1:K−2],Q)
)
− (61)(
N
T
− 1
)
(K − 1)L−H(AE |Q) (62)
≤
(
N
T
)K−1
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(AE |Q)−
(
1−
T
N
)[N
T
(K − 1)L+
(
N
T
)2
(K − 2)L (63)
+ · · ·+
(
N
T
)K−1
L
]
(64)
=
(
N
T
)K−1
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(AE |Q)−
(
N
T
)K
− N
T
N
T
− 1
L− (K − 1)L (65)
≤
((
N
T
)K−1
−
E
N
)
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)−
(
N
T
)K
− N
T
N
T
− 1
L− (K − 1)L, (66)
where (50) is due to system-privacy (2). Steps (51)-(58) follows by repeating the chain rule and by
the fact that from AT , A
[i]
T
andQ one can decodeWi for i = [1 : K−1]. Step (60) follows by using
inequality (45) for k = K. By iteratively using inequality (45) for k = {K − 1, K − 2, . . . , 2},
we obtain (64). The last step follows by averaging over all E with size E and applying Han’s
DRAFT
14
inequality.
Therefore,
( (
N
T
)K−1
− E
N
)
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) ≥
(NT )
K
−1
N
T
−1
L, and hence
R =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[1]
n )
≤
L
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q)
≤
(
N
T
− 1
) (N
T
)K−1
− E
N(
N
T
)K
− 1
(67)
=
(
1−
T
N
)
1− E
N
·
(
T
N
)K−1
1−
(
T
N
)K (68)
= RT-EPIR. (69)
To obtain a lower bound on the amount of common randomness needed to guarantee system-
privacy, for any set of nodes E ⊂ [1 : N ] with size |E| = E,
0 = I(AE ;W[1:K]|Q) (70)
= H(AE |Q)−H(AE |W[1:K],Q) (71)
= H(AE |Q)−H(AE |W[1:K],Q) +H(AE |W[1:K], S,Q) (72)
= H(AE |Q)− I(S;AE |W[1:K],Q) (73)
= H(AE |Q)−H(S|W[1:K],Q) +H(S|AE ,W[1:K],Q) (74)
≥ H(AE |Q)−H(S), (75)
where (72) holds because AE is a deterministic function of W[1:K], S and Q. By averaging over
all E with size E and applying Han’s inequality,
H(S) ≥
1(
N
E
) ∑
E⊂[1:N ]
|E|=E
H(AE |Q) ≥
E
N
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) (76)
≥
E
N
(
1−
(
T
N
)K)
(
1− T
N
) (
1− E
N
·
(
T
N
)K−1)L. (77)
Therefore, ρT-EPIR =
H(S)
L
≥
E
N
(
1−( TN )
K
)
(1− TN )
(
1−E
N
·( TN )
K−1
) .
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V. INNER BOUND WHEN E ≤ T
In this section, we present an achievable scheme for the case when the eavesdropper can tap
in on any E databases where E ≤ T . The scheme is modified from the TPIR scheme in [6], by
downloading K rounds where each round use the scheme in [6] with different part of the files
and different part of the common randomness generated by the databases. The three principles
in [6] still apply in our scheme.
1) Symmetry across databases
2) Symmetry of file indices within the queries to each database
3) Exploiting the side information of undesired files to retrieve the desired file information
Specifically, the new ingredient of our scheme lies in iterating the scheme in K rounds to ensure
each file is mixed with the common randomness in the same way, hence to fulfill principle
2. In the following, we firstly introduce five examples. We explain in details of the examples
in Section V-A and Section V-E about the decodability of the scheme, the guarantee of user-
privacy and system-privacy, and only show the construction of the other three examples. Finally
in Section V-F, we show the scheme for general parameters of N,K, T, E.
We first reprise the following lemma from [6]. The lemma states that by multiplying determin-
istic full rank matrices on uniformly i.i.d. random matrices, the statistics of the random matrices
remain unchanged. The proof can be found in [6].
Lemma 4 ( [6]). Let S1,S2, . . . ,SK ∈ F
α×α
q be K random matrices, drawn independently and
uniformly from all α× α full-rank matrices over Fq. Let G1,G2, . . . ,GKF
β×β
q be K invertible
square matrices of dimension β × β over Fq where β ≤ α. Let I1, I2, . . . , IK ∈ N
1×β be K
index vectors, each containing β distinct indices from [1 : α], then
(S1[:, I1]G1,S2[:, I2]G2, . . . ,SK [:, IK ]GK) ∼ (S1[:, (1 : β)],S2[:, (1 : β)], . . . ,SK [:, (1 : β)])
(78)
where Si[:, Ii] denotes the α× β matrix comprised of the columns of Si with indices in Ii, and
∼ denotes the relation that the random variables on both sides are identically distributed.
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DB1 DB2 DB3
a
(r)
1 , a
(r)
2 a
(r)
3 , a
(r)
4 a
(r)
5 , a
(r)
6
b
(r)
1 , b
(r)
2 b
(r)
3 , b
(r)
4 b
(r)
5 , b
(r)
6
a
(r)
7 + b
(r)
7 a
(r)
8 + b
(r)
8 a
(r)
9 + b
(r)
9
TABLE I: The download scheme for each round r, where r = 1 and r = 2.
A. Example: N = 3 databases, K = 2 files, T = 2 colluding databases, E = 1 eavesdropped
database
Suppose each file contains L = 13 symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fq, W1 =
W
[1:13]
1 and W2 = W
[1:13]
2 are represented as length-13 vectors over Fq. W.l.o.g., assume the user
wants to retrieve W1.
The user downloads in two rounds, with 15 symbols in each round as described in Table I
and with detailed formulation below. The databases generate 10 uniformly random symbols, 5
for each round, denoted as (S
(1)
[1:5], S
(2)
[1:5]). The scheme achieves the rate R = 13/30.
Let {λ1, . . . , λ9} be 9 distinct nonzero elements from Fq . Let G
7×9
[1:7] and G
2×9
[8:9] be two gener-
ating matrices of MDS codes as follows,
G
7×9
[1:7] =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λ9
...
...
. . .
...
λ61 λ
6
2 . . . λ
6
9

, (79)
G
2×9
[8:9] =

 1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λ9

 · diag(λ71, λ72, . . . , λ79) (80)
=

λ71 λ72 . . . λ79
λ81 λ
8
2 . . . λ
8
9

 . (81)
Let G = [G7×9[1:7] G
2×9
[8:9]]
T, then G is a 9 × 9 invertible matrix. Similarly, let G6×9[1:6] and G
3×9
[7:9]
be composed of the first six rows and the last three rows of G respectively.
The user privately generates matrices S1,S2,S3,S4 ∈ F
9×9
q uniformly and independently from
all 9× 9 invertible matrices over Fq.
Let G6×91 be the generating matrix of a (9, 6)-MDS code.
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Round 1:
a
(1)
[1:9] =
(
W
[1:7]
1 G
7×9
[1:7] + [S
(1)
1 S
(1)
2 ]G
2×9
[8:9]
)
S1 (82)
b
(1)
[1:9] =
(
W
[8:13]
2 G
6×9
[1:6] + [S
(1)
3 S
(1)
4 S
(1)
5 ]G
3×9
[7:9]
)
S2[:, (1 : 6)]G
6×9
1 (83)
Round 2:
a
(2)
[1:9] =
(
W
[8:13]
1 G
6×9
[1:6] + [S
(2)
3 S
(2)
4 S
(2)
5 ]G
3×9
[7:9]
)
S3 (84)
b
(2)
[1:9] =
(
W
[1:7]
2 G
7×9
[1:7] + [S
(2)
1 S
(2)
2 ]G
2×9
[8:9]
)
S4[:, (1 : 6)]G
6×9
1 (85)
Correctness: In round 1, the user can solve b
(1)
[7:9] from b
(1)
[1:6], because G
6×9
3 is the generating
matrix of a (9, 6)-MDS code. Therefore, the user can cancel the interference b
(1)
[7:9] and obtain
a
(1)
[7:9]. From a
(1)
[1:9], the user can solve W
[1:7]
1 , because a
(1)
[1:9] = [W
[1:7]
1 S
(1)
1 S
(1)
2 ]GS1, where G and
S1 are invertible matrices. Similarly in round 2, the user can solve W
[8:13]
1 . Hence, the user can
solve all 13 symbols of W1.
User-privacy: Any T = 2 databases may collude and observe the queries composed of 6 symbols
from a
(r)
[1:9] and b
(r)
[1:9] for each round. Let Ia, Ib denote the indices of the symbols observed by
the colluding databases,(
a
(1)
Ia
, a
(2)
Ia
, b
(1)
Ib
, b
(2)
Ib
)
(86)
=
([
W
[1:7]
1 S
(1)
1 S
(1)
2
]
GS1[:, Ia],
[
W
[8:13]
1 S
(2)
3 S
(2)
4 S
(2)
5
]
GS3[:, Ia], (87)[
W
[8:13]
2 S
(1)
3 S
(1)
4 S
(1)
5
]
GS2[:, (1 : 6)]G
6×9
1 [:, Ib],
[
W
[1:7]
2 S
(2)
1 S
(2)
2
]
GS4[:, (1 : 6)]G
6×9
1 [:, Ib]
)
(88)
∼
([
W
[1:7]
1 S
(1)
1 S
(1)
2
]
S1[:, (1 : 6)],
[
W
[8:13]
1 S
(2)
3 S
(2)
4 S
(2)
5
]
S3[:, (1 : 6)], (89)[
W
[8:13]
2 S
(1)
3 S
(1)
4 S
(1)
5
]
S2[:, (1 : 6)],
[
W
[1:7]
2 S
(2)
1 S
(2)
2
]
S4[:, (1 : 6)]
)
. (90)
The two rounds of download can be randomized by the user. Therefore, the symbols observed
by the two databases are obtained by random mappings from linear combinations of W1 and
W2 and the random symbols S
(1)
[1:5], S
(2)
[1:5] generated by the databases in the same way, where the
randomness of the mapping is privately generated by the user and unavailable to the databases.
Hence, user-privacy is guaranteed.
System-privacy: The eavesdropper can tap in on an arbitrary database. Because the scheme
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is symmetric across the databases, w.l.o.g., assume DB1 is eavesdropped. In round 1, from
equation (82) a
(1)
1 , a
(1)
2 are constructed by adding linearly independent combinations of S
(1)
1 , S
(1)
2 .
Similarly from equation (83), b
(1)
1 , b
(1)
2 , b
(1)
7 are constructed by adding linearly independent com-
binations of S
(1)
3 , S
(1)
4 , S
(1)
5 . Specifically, denote the five answers from DB1 in round 1 by A
(1)
DB1,
the linear combinations of the S
(1)
[1:5] added to the answers are constructed by,
[S
(1)
1 S
(1)
2 S
(1)
3 S
(1)
4 S
(1)
5 ] ·


[
G
2×9
[8:9]S1[:, (1 : 2)]
]2×2
0
2×2
[
G
2×9
[8:9]S1[:, 7]
]2×1
0
3×2
[
G
2×9
[7:9]S2[:, (1 : 6)]G
6×9
1 [:, (1, 2, 7)]
]3×3

 .
(91)
It can be checked that the 5×5 matrix in (91) is invertible. Therefore,H(A
(1)
DB1) = H(A
(1)
DB1|W1,W2) =
5 log q. Hence, I(A
(1)
DB1;W1,W2) = 0. The construction of symbols for round 2 are in a similar
way, by adding linearly independent combinations of S
(2)
[1:5]. Because the 10 symbols S
(1)
[1:5], S
(2)
[1:5]
are independently and uniformly chosen from Fq, we have I(A
(1)
DB1, A
(2)
DB1;W1,W2) = 0 and
hence the eavesdropper obtains no information regarding the database W1,W2.
B. Example: N = 4 databases, K = 2 files, T = 2 colluding databases, E = 1 eavesdropped
database
Suppose each file consists of L = 13 symbols and is represented as a length-13 row vector over
a sufficiently large field Fq, denoted by W1 = W
[1:13]
1 and W2 = W
[1:13]
2 . The user downloads
two rounds. For each round, the user downloads 12 symbols. The databases generate 6 uniformly
random symbols S
(1)
[1:3], S
(2)
[1:3]. The scheme achieves the rate R = 13/24.
The user privately generates matrices S1,S2,S3,S4 ∈ F
8×8
q uniformly and independently from
all 8× 8 invertible matrices over Fq.
Let {λ1, . . . , λ8} be 8 distinct nonzero elements from Fq. Let G be a 8× 8 matrix defined as
follows,
G =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λ8
...
...
. . .
...
λ71 λ
7
2 . . . λ
7
8

, (92)
it is direct that G is an invertible matrix. Let G7×8[1:7] and G
1×8
[8] be matrices composed of the
first 7 rows and the 8th row respectively, such that G = [G7×8[1:7] G
1×8
[8] ]
T. Similarly, let G6×8[1:6]
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and G2×8[7:8] be matrices composed of the first 6 rows and the last 2 rows respectively, such that
G = [G6×8[1:6] G
2×8
[7:8]]
T. The matrices G7×8[1:7], G
1×8
[8] , G
6×8
[1:6] and G
2×8
[7:8] are generating matrices of MDS
codes with corresponding dimensions.
Let G4×81 be the generating matrix of a (8, 4)-MDS code.
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a
(r)
1 a
(r)
2 a
(r)
3 a
(r)
4
b
(r)
1 b
(r)
2 b
(r)
3 b
(r)
4
a
(r)
5 + b
(r)
5 a
(r)
6 + b
(r)
6 a
(r)
7 + b
(r)
7 a
(r)
8 + b
(r)
8
Round 1:
a
(1)
[1:8] =
(
W
[1:7]
1 G
7×8
[1:7] + S
(1)
1 G
1×8
[8]
)
S1 (93)
b
(1)
[1:8] =
(
W
[8:13]
2 G
6×8
[1:6] + [S
(1)
2 S
(1)
3 ]G
2×8
[7:8]
)
S2[:, (1 : 4)]G
4×8
1 (94)
Round 2:
a
(2)
[1:8] =
(
W
[8:13]
1 G
6×8
[1:6] + [S
(2)
2 S
(2)
3 ]G
2×8
[7:8]
)
S3 (95)
b
(2)
[1:8] =
(
W
[1:7]
2 G
7×8
[1:7] + S
(2)
1 G
1×8
[8]
)
S4[:, (1 : 4)]G
4×8
1 (96)
C. Example: N = 4 databases, K = 2 files, T = 3 colluding databases, E = 1 eavesdropped
database
Suppose each file consists of L = 25 symbols and is represented as a length-25 row vector over
a sufficiently large field Fq, denoted byW1 = W
[1:25]
1 andW2 = W
[1:25]
2 . The user downloads two
rounds. For each round, the user downloads 28 symbols. The databases generate 14 uniformly
random symbols S
(1)
[1:7], S
(2)
[1:7]. The scheme achieves the rate R = 25/56.
The user privately generates matrices S1,S2,S3,S4 ∈ F
16×16
q uniformly and independently
from all 16× 16 invertible matrices over Fq.
Let {λ1, . . . , λ16} be 16 distinct nonzero elements from Fq. Let G be a 16×16 matrix defined
as follows,
G2 =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λ16
...
...
. . .
...
λ151 λ
15
2 . . . λ
15
16

, (97)
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it is direct thatG is an invertible matrix. LetG13×16[1:13] andG
3×16
[14:16] be matrices composed of the first
13 rows and the last 3 rows respectively, such that G = [G13×16[1:13] G
3×16
[14:16]]
T. Similarly, let G12×16[1:12]
and G4×16[13:16] be matrices composed of the first 12 rows and the last 4 rows respectively, such
that G = [G12×16[1:12] G
4×16
[13:16]]
T. The matrices G13×16[1:13] , G
3×16
[14:16], G
12×16
[1:12] and G
4×16
[13:16] are generating
matrices of MDS codes with corresponding dimensions.
Let G12×161 be the generating matrix of a (16, 12)-MDS code.
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a
(r)
1 , a
(r)
2 , a
(r)
3 a
(r)
4 , a
(r)
5 , a
(r)
6 a
(r)
7 , a
(r)
8 , a
(r)
9 a
(r)
10 , a
(r)
11 , a
(r)
12
b
(r)
1 , b
(r)
2 , b
(r)
3 b
(r)
4 , b
(r)
5 , b
(r)
6 b
(r)
7 , b
(r)
8 , b
(r)
9 b
(r)
10 , b
(r)
11 , b
(r)
12
a
(r)
13 + b
(r)
13 a
(r)
14 + b
(r)
14 a
(r)
15 + b
(r)
15 a
(r)
16 + b
(r)
16
Round 1:
a
(1)
[1:16] =
(
W
[1:13]
1 G
13×16
[1:13] + [S
(1)
1 S
(1)
2 S
(1)
3 ]G
3×16
[14:16]
)
S1 (98)
b
(1)
[1:16] =
(
W
[14:25]
2 G
12×16
[1:12] + [S
(1)
4 S
(1)
5 S
(1)
6 S
(1)
7 ]G
4×16
[13:16]
)
S2[:, (1 : 12)]G
12×16
1 (99)
Round 2:
a
(2)
[1:16] =
(
W
14:25]
1 G
12×16
[1:12] + [S
(2)
4 S
(2)
5 S
(2)
6 S
(2)
7 ]G
4×16
[13:16]
)
S3 (100)
b
(2)
[1:16] =
(
W
[1:13]
2 G
13×16
[1:13] + [S
(2)
1 S
(2)
2 S
(2)
3 ]G
3×16
[14:16]
)
S4[:, (1 : 12)]G
12×16
1 (101)
D. Example: N = 4 databases, K = 2 files, T = 3 colluding databases, E = 2 eavesdropped
databases
Suppose each file contains L = 18 symbols and is represented as a length-18 row vector over
a sufficiently large field Fq, denoted byW1 = W
[1:18]
1 andW2 = W
[1:18]
2 . The user downloads two
rounds. For each round, the user downloads 28 symbols. The databases generate 28 uniformly
random symbols S
(1)
[1:14], S
(2)
[1:14]. The scheme achieves the rate R = 18/56 = 9/28.
The user privately generates matrices S1,S2,S3,S4 ∈ F
16×16
q uniformly and independently
from all 16× 16 invertible matrices over Fq.
Let {λ1, . . . , λ16} be 16 distinct nonzero elements from Fq. Let G be a 16×16 matrix defined
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as follows,
G =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λ16
...
...
. . .
...
λ151 λ
15
2 . . . λ
15
16

, (102)
it is direct that G is an invertible matrix. Let G10×16[1:10] and G
6×16
[11:16] be matrices composed of the
first 10 rows and the last 6 rows respectively, such that G = [G10×16[1:10] G
6×16
[11:16]]
T. Similarly, let
G
8×16
[1:8] and G
8×16
[9:16] be matrices composed of the first 8 rows and the last 8 rows respectively,
such that G = [G8×16[1:8] G
8×16
[9:16]]
T. The matrices G10×16[1:10] , G
6×16
[11:16], G
8×16
[1:8] and G
8×16
[9:16] are generating
matrices of MDS codes with corresponding dimensions.
Let G12×161 be the generating matrix of a (16, 12)-MDS code.
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a
(r)
1 , a
(r)
2 , a
(r)
3 a
(r)
4 , a
(r)
5 , a
(r)
6 a
(r)
7 , a
(r)
8 , a
(r)
9 a
(r)
10 , a
(r)
11 , a
(r)
12
b
(r)
1 , b
(r)
2 , b
(r)
3 b
(r)
4 , b
(r)
5 , b
(r)
6 b
(r)
7 , b
(r)
8 , b
(r)
9 b
(r)
10 , b
(r)
11 , b
(r)
12
a
(r)
13 + b
(r)
13 a
(r)
14 + b
(r)
14 a
(r)
15 + b
(r)
15 a
(r)
16 + b
(r)
16
Round 1:
a
(1)
[1:16] =
(
W
[1:10]
1 G
10×16
[1:10] + S
(1)
[1:6]G
6×16
[11:16]
)
S1 (103)
b
(1)
[1:16] =
(
W
[11:18]
2 G
8×16
[1:8] + S
(1)
[7:14]G
8×16
[9:16]
)
S2[:, (1 : 12)]G
12×16
1 (104)
Round 2:
a
(2)
[1:16] =
(
W
[11:18]
1 G
8×16
[1:8] + S
(2)
[7:14]G
8×16
[9:16]
)
S3 (105)
b
(2)
[1:16] =
(
W
[1:10]
2 G
10×16
[1:10] + S
(2)
[1:6]G
6×16
[11:16]
)
S4[:, (1 : 12)]G
12×16
1 (106)
E. Example: N = 3 databases, K = 3 files, T = 2 colluding databases, E = 1 eavesdropped
database
Suppose each file contains L = 62 symbols. Let the symbols of each file be randomly permuted
(the randomness is generated privately by the user) and be represented as a length-62 row vector
over a sufficiently large field Fq, denoted by W1 = W
[1:62]
1 , W2 = W
[1:62]
2 and W3 = W
[1:62]
3 . The
user downloads three rounds. For each round, the user downloads 57 symbols. The databases
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generate 57 uniformly random symbols, 19 for each round and denoted as S
(1)
[1:19], S
(2)
[1:19], S
(3)
[1:19],
for protecting the database from the eavesdropper. The scheme achieves the rate R = 62/171.
Let {λ1, . . . , λ27} be 27 distinct nonzero elements from Fq. Let G be a 27×27 matrix defined
as follows,
G =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λ27
...
...
. . .
...
λ261 λ
26
2 . . . λ
26
27

, (107)
it is direct thatG is an invertible matrix. LetG18×27[1:18] andG
9×27
[19:27] be matrices composed of the first
18 rows and the last 9 rows respectively, such that G = [G18×27[1:18] G
9×27
[19:27]]
T. Similarly, let G21×27[1:21]
and G6×27[22:27] be matrices composed of the first 21 rows and the last 6 rows respectively, and
G
23×27
[1:23] and G
4×27
[24:27] be matrices composed of the first 23 rows and the last 4 rows respectively.
The matrices G18×27[1:18] , G
9×27
[19:27], G
21×27
[1:21] ,G
6×27
[22:27], G
23×27
[1:23] and G
4×27
[24:27] are generating matrices of
MDS codes with corresponding dimensions.
The user privately generates 9 matrices S
(1)
[1:3],S
(2)
[1:3],S
(3)
[1:3] ∈ F
27×27
q uniformly and indepen-
dently from all 27× 27 invertible matrices over Fq.
Let G12×181 and G
6×9
2 be the generating matrices of a (18, 12)-MDS code and a (9, 6)-MDS
code respectively.
DB1 DB2 DB3
a
(r)
1 , a
(r)
2 , a
(r)
3 , a
(r)
4 a
(r)
5 , a
(r)
6 , a
(r)
7 , a
(r)
8 a
(r)
9 , a
(r)
10 , a
(r)
11 , a
(r)
12
b
(r)
1 , b
(r)
2 , b
(r)
3 , b
(r)
4 b
(r)
5 , b
(r)
6 , b
(r)
7 , b
(r)
8 b
(r)
9 , b
(r)
10 , b
(r)
11 , b
(r)
12
c
(r)
1 , c
(r)
2 , c
(r)
3 , c
(r)
4 c
(r)
5 , c
(r)
6 , c
(r)
7 , c
(r)
8 c
(r)
9 , c
(r)
10 , c
(r)
11 , c
(r)
12
a
(r)
13 + b
(r)
13 a
(r)
15 + b
(r)
15 a
(r)
21 + b
(r)
17
a
(r)
14 + b
(r)
14 a
(r)
16 + b
(r)
16 a
(r)
22 + b
(r)
18
a
(r)
17 + c
(r)
13 a
(r)
19 + c
(r)
15 a
(r)
23 + c
(r)
17
a
(r)
18 + c
(r)
14 a
(r)
20 + c
(r)
16 a
(r)
24 + c
(r)
18
b
(r)
19 + c
(r)
19 b
(r)
21 + c
(r)
21 b
(r)
23 + c
(r)
23
b
(r)
20 + c
(r)
20 b
(r)
22 + c
(r)
22 b
(r)
24 + c
(r)
24
a
(r)
25 + b
(r)
25 + c
(r)
25 a
(r)
26 + b
(r)
26 + c
(r)
26 a
(r)
27 + b
(r)
27 + c
(r)
27
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Round 1:
a
(1)
[1:27] =
(
W
[1:18]
1 G
18×27
[1:18] + S
(1)
[1:9]G
9×27
[19:27]
)
S
(1)
1 (108)
b
(1)
[1:18] =
(
W
[19:39]
2 G
21×27
[1:21] + S
(1)
[10:15]G
6×27
[22:27]
)
S
(1)
2 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 (109)
b
(1)
[19:27] =
(
W
[19:39]
2 G
21×27
[1:21] + S
(1)
[10:15]G
6×27
[22:27]
)
S
(1)
2 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 (110)
c
(1)
[1:18] =
(
W
[40:62]
3 G
23×27
[1:23] + S
(1)
[16:19]G
4×27
[24:27]
)
S
(1)
3 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 (111)
c
(1)
[19:27] =
(
W
[40:62]
3 G
23×27
[1:23] + S
(1)
[16:19]G
4×27
[24:27]
)
S
(1)
3 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 (112)
Round 2:
a
(2)
[1:27] =
(
W
[19:39]
1 G
21×27
[1:21] + S
(2)
[10:15]G
6×27
[22:27]
)
S
(2)
1 (113)
b
(2)
[1:18] =
(
W
[40:62]
2 G
23×27
[1:23] + S
(2)
[16:19]G
4×27
[24:27]
)
S
(2)
2 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 (114)
b
(1)
[19:27] =
(
W
[40:62]
2 G
23×27
[1:23] + S
(2)
[16:19]G
4×27
[24:27]
)
S
(2)
2 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 (115)
c
(1)
[1:18] =
(
W
[1:18]
3 G
18×27
[1:18] + S
(2)
[1:9]G
9×27
[19:27]
)
S
(2)
3 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 (116)
c
(1)
[19:27] =
(
W
[1:18]
3 G
18×27
[1:18] + S
(2)
[1:9]G
9×27
[19:27]
)
S
(2)
3 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 (117)
Round 3:
a
(3)
[1:27] =
(
W
[40:62]
1 G
23×27
[1:23] + S
(3)
[16:19]G
4×27
[29:27]
)
S
(3)
1 (118)
b
(3)
[1:18] =
(
W
[1:18]
1 G
18×27
[1:18] + S
(3)
[1:9]G
9×27
[19:27]
)
S
(3)
2 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 (119)
b
(3)
[19:27] =
(
W
[1:18]
1 G
18×27
[1:18] + S
(3)
[1:9]G
9×27
[19:27]
)
S
(3)
2 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 (120)
c
(3)
[1:18] =
(
W
[19:39]
3 G
21×27
[1:21] + S
(3)
[10:15]G
6×27
[22:27]
)
S
(3)
3 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 (121)
c
(3)
[19:27] =
(
W
[19:39]
3 G
21×27
[1:21] + S
(3)
[10:15]G
6×27
[22:27]
)
S
(3)
3 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 (122)
Correctness: For each round, the user can recover b
(r)
[13:18] and c
(r)
[13:18] from b
(r)
[1:12] and c
(r)
[1:12].
Therefore, the user can cancel the interference and solve a
(r)
[13:24]. Similarly, the user can recover
and cancel b
(r)
[25:27] + c
(r)
[25:27] and obtain a
(r)
[25:27], because b
(r)
[19:27] and c
(r)
[19:27] are generated from the
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same (9, 6)-MDS code. Hence, the user can solve a
(r)
[1:27] for all three rounds. For round 1, we
havea
(1)
[1:27] =
[
W
[1:18]
1 S
(1)
[1:9]
]
GS
(1)
1 . Because G and S
(1)
1 are invertible matrices, the user can solve
18 symbols W
[1:18]
1 . Similarly, the user can solve W
[19:39]
1 and W
[40:62]
1 for both round 2 and
round 3. Hence, the user obtains all 62 symbols of W1.
User-privacy: Any T = 2 databases may collude and observe the queries composed of 18
symbols from a
(r)
[1:27], 12 symbols from both b
(r)
[1:18] and c
(r)
[1:18], and 6 symbols from both b
(r)
[19:27]
and c
(r)
[19:27] for each round. Let Ia, Ib,12, Ib,6, Ic,12, Ic,6 denote the indices of the symbols observed
by the colluding databases,

a
(1)
Ia
, a
(2)
Ia
, a
(3)
Ia
(b
(1)
Ib,12
, b
(1)
Ib,6
), (b
(2)
Ib,12
, b
(2)
Ib,6
), (b
(3)
Ib,12
, b
(3)
Ib,6
)
(c
(1)
Ic,12
, c
(1)
Ic,6
), (c
(2)
Ic,12
, c
(2)
Ic,6
), (c
(3)
Ic,12
, c
(3)
Ic,6
)

 (123)
=


[
W
[1:18]
1 S
(1)
[1:9]
]
GS
(1)
1 [:, Ia],
[
W
[19:39]
1 S
(2)
[10:15]
]
GS
(2)
1 [:, Ia],
[
W
[40:62]
1 S
(3)
[16:19]
]
GS
(3)
1 [:, Ia]

(
[
W
[19:39]
2 S
(1)
[10:15]
]
GS
(1)
2 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 [:, Ib,12],
[
W
[19:39]
2 S
(1)
[10:15]
]
GS
(1)
2 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 [:, Ib,6])
(
[
W
[40:62]
2 S
(2)
[16:19]
]
GS
(2)
2 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 [:, Ib,12],
[
W
[40:62]
2 S
(2)
[16:19]
]
GS
(2)
2 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 [:, Ib,6])
(
[
W
[1:18]
2 S
(3)
[1:9]
]
GS
(3)
2 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 [:, Ib,12],
[
W
[1:18]
2 S
(3)
[1:9]
]
GS
(3)
2 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 [:, Ib,6])


T


(
[
W
[40:62]
3 S
(1)
[16:19]
]
GS
(1)
3 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 [:, Ic,12],
[
W
[40:62]
3 S
(1)
[16:19]
]
GS
(1)
3 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 [:, Ic,6])
(
[
W
[1:18]
3 S
(2)
[1:9]
]
GS
(2)
3 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 [:, Ic,12],
[
W
[1:18]
3 S
(2)
[1:9]
]
GS
(2)
3 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 [:, Ic,6])
(
[
W
[19:39]
3 S
(3)
[10:15]
]
GS
(3)
3 [:, (1 : 12)]G
12×18
1 [:, Ic,12],
[
W
[19:39]
3 S
(3)
[10:15]
]
GS
(3)
3 [:, (13 : 18)]G
6×9
2 [:, Ic,6])


T


(124)
∼


[
W
[1:18]
1 S
(1)
[1:9]
]
GS
(1)
1 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[19:39]
1 S
(2)
[10:15]
]
GS
(2)
1 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[40:62]
1 S
(3)
[16:19]
]
GS
(3)
1 [:, (1 : 18)]

(
[
W
[19:39]
2 S
(1)
[10:15]
]
GS
(1)
2 [:, (1 : 12)],
[
W
[19:39]
2 S
(1)
[10:15]
]
GS
(1)
2 [:, (13 : 18)])
(
[
W
[40:62]
2 S
(2)
[16:19]
]
GS
(2)
2 [:, (1 : 12)],
[
W
[40:62]
2 S
(2)
[16:19]
]
GS
(2)
2 [:, (13 : 18)])
(
[
W
[1:18]
2 S
(3)
[1:9]
]
GS
(3)
2 [:, (1 : 12)],
[
W
[1:18]
2 S
(3)
[1:9]
]
GS
(3)
2 [:, (13 : 18)])


T


(
[
W
[40:62]
3 S
(1)
[16:19]
]
GS
(1)
3 [:, (1 : 12)],
[
W
[40:62]
3 S
(1)
[16:19]
]
GS
(1)
3 [:, (13 : 18)])
(
[
W
[1:18]
3 S
(2)
[1:9]
]
GS
(2)
3 [:, (1 : 12)],
[
W
[1:18]
3 S
(2)
[1:9]
]
GS
(2)
3 [:, (13 : 18)])
(
[
W
[19:39]
3 S
(3)
[10:15]
]
GS
(3)
3 [:, (1 : 12)],
[
W
[19:39]
3 S
(3)
[10:15]
]
GS
(3)
3 [:, (13 : 18)])


T


(125)
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=


[
W
[1:18]
1 S
(1)
[1:9]
]
GS
(1)
1 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[19:39]
1 S
(2)
[10:15]
]
GS
(2)
1 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[40:62]
1 S
(3)
[16:19]
]
GS
(3)
1 [:, (1 : 18)][
W
[19:39]
2 S
(1)
[10:15]
]
GS
(1)
2 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[40:62]
2 S
(2)
[16:19]
]
GS
(2)
2 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[1:18]
2 S
(3)
[1:9]
]
GS
(3)
2 [:, (1 : 18)][
W
[40:62]
3 S
(1)
[16:19]
]
GS
(1)
3 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[1:18]
3 S
(2)
[1:9]
]
GS
(2)
3 [:, (1 : 18)],
[
W
[19:39]
3 S
(3)
[10:15]
]
GS
(3)
3 [:, (1 : 18)]


(126)
The user can randomize the three rounds of downloading. Therefore, the symbols requested at
the two colluding databases are mapped from the symbols of each file and the S
(r)
i ’s in the same
way. Hence, user-privacy is guaranteed.
System-privacy: Similar as in the example in Section V-A, the answers from any database is
composed by adding linearly independent combinations of S
(r)
[1:19] for each round. Therefore,
the eavesdropper obtains no information regarding the database W1,W2,W3 and hence system-
privacy is guaranteed.
F. For arbitrary N , K, T and E (E < T )
Denote J = N
K−TK
N−T
, and suppose each file comprises L = KNK −EJ = KNK −EN
K−TK
N−T
symbols from a large enough finite field. The user downloads K rounds, with NJ symbols
per round. The database generates KEJ uniformly random symbols, denoted by S
(r)
[1:EJ ] where
r = [1 : K].
Divide [1 : L] and [1 : EJ ] into K disjoint sets in the following way,
[1 : L] = W1︸︷︷︸
size NK−ENK−1
∪ W2︸︷︷︸
size NK−ETNK−2
∪ . . . ∪ WK−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
size NK−ETK−2N
∪ WK︸︷︷︸
size NK−ETK−1
(127)
[1 : EJ ] = S1︸︷︷︸
size ENK−1
∪ S2︸︷︷︸
size ETNK−2
∪ . . . ∪ SK−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
size ETK−2N
∪ SK︸︷︷︸
size ETK−1
(128)
such that |Wi|+|Si| = N
K . Therefore,W
[1:L]
k = {W
W1
k , . . . ,W
WK
k } and S
(r)
[1:EJ ] = {S
(r)
S1
, . . . , S
(r)
SK
}.
Let {λ1, . . . , λNK} be N
K distinct nonzero elements from Fq. Let G be a N
K ×NK matrix
defined as follows,
G =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λNK
...
...
. . .
...
λN
K−1
1 λ
NK−1
2 . . . λ
NK−1
NK

, (129)
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it is direct that G is an invertible matrix. In the following, we divide G into K pairs of matrices
{G
|Wi|×NK
Wi
,G
|Si|×NK
Si
} for i = [1 : K], where G
|Wi|×NK
Wi
is composed of the first |Wi| rows of G
and G
|Si|×NK
Si
is composed of the last |Si| rows of G. It is direct that these 2K matrices are gen-
erating matrices of MDS codes with corresponding dimensions, and G = [G
|Wi|×N
K
Wi
G
|Si|×N
K
Si
]T
For each round r and each file index k, let V
(r)
k be the length-N
K vector defined as follows,
V
(r)
k = W
Wk+r−1 mod K
k G
|Wk+r−1 mod K |×N
K
Wk+r−1 mod K
+ S
(r)
Sk+r−1 mod K
G
|Sk+r−1 mod K |×N
K
Sk+r−1 mod K
(130)
=
[
W
Wk+r−1 mod K
k S
(r)
Sk+r−1 mod K
]
G, (131)
therefore, the K index set pairs (Wi,Si) is rotated in all K round for each file index k ∈ [1 : K].
This is to assure user-privacy.
The user privately generates K2 matrices S
(1)
[1:K],S
(2)
[1:K], . . . ,S
(K)
[1:K] ∈ F
NK×NK
q uniformly and
independently from all NK ×NK invertible matrices over Fq.
Suppose the user wants to retrieve Wl. For any undesired file index k ∈ [1 : K] \ {l},
there are ∆ = 2K−2 distinct subsets of [1 : K] which contain k and do not contain l, denoted
by K1,K2, . . . ,K∆. For i ∈ [1 : ∆], let αi = N(N − T )
|Ki|−1TK−|Ki|, choose ∆ matrices
G
α1×
N
T
α1
1 , . . . ,G
α∆×
N
T
α∆
∆ be the generating matrices of the MDS codes with corresponding
dimensions.
For each round r, apply the scheme in [6] for V
(r)
[1:K] as described in (131). For any undesired
file index k ∈ [1 : K] \ {l},
X
(r)
k =
[
x
[k],(r)
K1
x
[k],(r)
K1∪{l}
x
[k],(r)
K2
x
[k],(r)
K2∪{l}
· · · x
[k],(r)
K∆
x
[k],(r)
K∆∪{l}
]
(132)
= V
(r)
k S
(r)
k [:, (1 : TN
K−1)]


G
α1×
N
T
α1
1 0 · · · 0
0 G
α2×
N
T
α2
2 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 G
α∆×
N
T
α∆
∆

 , (133)
where the length of x
[k],(r)
Ki
is αi = N(N − T )
|Ki|−1TK−|Ki| and the length of x
[k],(r)
Ki∪{l}
is N−T
T
αi.
For the desired file index l, there are δ = 2K−1 distinct subsets of [1 : K] which contain l,
denoted by L1,L2, . . . ,Lδ. Let
X
(r)
l =
[
x
[l],(r)
L1
x
[l],(r)
L2
· · · x
[l],(r)
Lδ
]
= V
(r)
l S
(r)
l , (134)
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where the length of x
[l],(r)
Li
is N(N − T )|Li|−1TK−|Li|.
For each non-empty set K ∈ [1 : K], the queries associated with K is generated by
Q
(r)
K =
∑
k∈K
x
(r)
K . (135)
For all K rounds r ∈ [1 : K], distribute the queries for each K evenly among the N databases,
and the construction of the queries is completed.
Decodability, User-privacy, System-privacy, and the Achievable rate
From [6], for each round, the user can cancel the interference of the undesired files hence
obtain V
(r)
l for all K rounds. Furthermore, from (131), the user can solve for a different set
of symbols WWil each round, hence the user can obtain all the symbols of the desired file
W
[1:L]
l = {W
W1
l , . . . ,W
WK
l }.
To see why user-privacy is guaranteed, similarly as in [6], any T colluding servers observe
queries comprised of TNK−1 symbols of X
(r)
k for each round. Denote the index set of X
(r)
k
observed by the colluding servers by Ik, we have that for all k ∈ [1 : K],
X
(r)
Ik
∼ V
(r)
k S
(r)
k [:, (1 : TN
K−1)]. (136)
From (131), V
(r)
k are constructed from disjoint set of symbols of Wk in an iterative way through
the K rounds, and because S
(r)
k [:, (1 : TN
K−1)] are independently and identically distributed,
user-privacy is guaranteed since the colluding databases observe symbols constructed from all
Wk’s through the same random mapping.
System-privacy is guaranteed because from (128) and (131), for each round the EJ queries
and answers observed by the eavesdropper is constructed by adding independent linear combi-
nations of EJ independent uniform symbolsS
(r)
[1:EJ ]. Therefore, the eavesdropper can obtain no
information regarding the database W[1:K].
The rate achieved by the scheme is
R =
L
KNJ
=
KNK −EN
K−TK
N−T
KN N
K−TK
N−T
=
1− T
N
1− ( T
N
)K
−
E
KN
= RT-EPIR. (137)
The secrecy rate achieved is
ρ =
KEJ
L
=
KEN
K−TK
N−T
KNK − EN
K−TK
N−T
=
E
N
(
1− ( T
N
)K
)
1− T
N
− E
KN
(
1− ( T
N
)K
) . (138)
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